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CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CASES
RESOLVED ON STATE PENDENT AND
FEDERAL STATUTORY GROUNDS
INTRODUCTION

In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' the
Supreme Court held that federal courts do not have the equitable
'421 U.S. 240 (1975). Alyeska involved a suit by environmental groups
against those responsible for constructing the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs prevailed in the lawsuit, and asserted their right to fees under the "private
attorney general" exception to the "American Rule" that each party bears the cost
of its own lawyers. That exception had been viewed as supporting a fee award to
"'any litigant who vindicates an important public interest" Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 182 (1976).
In Alyeska, the Court sharply limited the application of this exception, and
expressly criticized its indiscriminate use as a basis for fee awards in "public
policy" cases. 421 U.S. at 263. The general view among the courts of appeals
today is that the private attorney general exception has been foreclosed as a basis
for a fee award. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 59 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
The Supreme Court enunciated the American Rule in Aracambel v. Wiseman,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (per curiam). The origin of the rule has been much
disputed, with some commentators claiming that it resulted from "accidental stat-utory history." Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CAL. L. BEv. 792, 798 (1966). Others urge that the "popular view of
the solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights played a significant role in the emergence
of the unique American Rule." Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 636, 641 (1974) (footnote omitted).
Judge Friendly's explanation is the most convincing, pointing out that "the American
practice.., was a deliberate departure from the English practice, stemming initially
from the colonies' distrust of lawyers and continued because of a belief that the
English system favored the wealthy and unduly penalized the losing party." Conte
-v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Goodhart,
Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 872-77 (1929)).
The "English Rule" to which Judge Friendly refers prevails in most European
countries. See generally Rubin & Stanford, The Sources of South African Law of
Costs, 65 S. Amn. L.J. 387 (1948); Goodhart, supra; Sweigert, The Legal System
of the Federal Republic of Germany, 11 HAsTI Gs L.J. 7 (1959). Under that rule,
the losing party-be it plaintiff or defendant-bears all costs of the litigation, including attorneys' fees. The rationale for the English Rule is that it operates
to deter plaintiffs from bringing groundless suits and defendants from defending
suits that they probably will not win. Goodhart, supra, at 872. The rule is administered by "taxing masters," who have unreviewable discretion in setting the fee
award. Id. 855.
The different effects of the two rules can be seen by considering a suit in
which the claim is colorable and the litigant-plaintiff or defendant-believes that
he or she has a fair chance at trial. In England, litigants asserting claims about
-which they are uncertain run a substantial financial risk. They may decide not to
go to court at all, because the threat of being taxed with fees almost raises a presumption against litigation. American litigants, however, have less to lose by proceeding to trial.
The appeal of the American Rule, therefore, is that it offers litigants a fair
,opportunity to have their day in court and does not discourage presentation of novel
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power to award -attorneys' fees for cases brought in the public interest. Rather, the Court concluded, it was for Congress to determine "the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be
awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those
awards ...

," 2

In response to this challenge, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 3 (Fees Act), establishing that
prevailing parties in an action to enforce various statutory provisions may be awarded fees within the court's discretion. 4 Thus, the
Fees Act seeks to encourage private enforcement of Reconstruction
Era statutes 5 outlawing racial discrimination and unconstitutional
legal theories. The rule reinforces the accessibility of American courts to litigants,
which Justice Harlan described as "an element of due process" in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1966). See A.B.A. SECTION oF Irr'L AND Comp. LAw,
1962 PocEmmEs 117, 118 (Report of Comm. on Comp. Proc. and Prac.) ("it is
sincerely the opinion of many practitioners that the right to sue without deterrence
by the specter of the possibility of paying an adversary's legal fees is part of our
democratic tradition and a bulwark of equality .... ").
Proponents of the American Rule also argue that the English Rule affects the
poor more severely because the costs of litigation may be very high; that fee
shifting creates a subtle conflict of interest because lawyers will seek to please the
judge instead of their clients, and that the time expended in calculating fees and
diffculties of proof pose burdens for judicial administration. See F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); see also Berger, Court
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable'?, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 281, 292 &
n.57 (1977) (collecting cases involving burden on judicial administration).
The rule in the Fees Act is a hybrid of the English and American Rules, providing that prevailing plaintiffs should usually recover fees but that prevailing
defendants should recover only in rare cases. The rule therefore provides plaintiffs
with an incentive to sue, but provides no such incentive for defendants to defend.
This, as one commentator notes, makes the defendant "balance the cost of payment
to the plaintiff [in settlement] against the expense of litigating. Defendant's litigation
expenses [including fees] afford the plaintiff a legalized form of blackmail." Kuenzel,
The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75, 78
(1963). Given the preference for plaintiffs central to the Fees Act and the strong
tradition of the American Rule, the Act should be viewed as a limited encroachment
on, not a legislative abrogation of, the rule.
2 421 U.S. at 262.
3
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).
4 The Act reads in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20
U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation
of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI
of the Civil Bights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (brackets in original).
5 The Fees Acts applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination
in the making and enforcement of contracts); id. § 1982 (forbidding discrimination
in lease and sale of real estate); id. § 1983 (prohibiting state deprivations of civil
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state action by providing for the payment of attorneys' fees to successful litigants.6
The Act has spawned many novel and important issues 7 This
Comment focuses upon the related questions whether fees should
be awarded when a case is decided on a pendent state claim or on
federal statutory grounds. Part I examines the use of the civil rights
statutes to litigate claims which are federal, but nonconstitutional,
and claims which are nonfederal. Part II examines the Fees Act,
its legislative history, and its purpose in order to determine Congress's understanding about fee awards for state pendent and federal
statutory claims. Part III considers potential eleventh-amendmentrelated sovereign immunity obstacles to fee awards against states on
such claims. Part IV suggests two ways in which courts can avoid
the potential sovereign immunity problem in these cases; it then
concludes that fee awards in pendent and statutory claim cases are
not barred by the eleventh amendment.

rights), and id. § 1985 (proscribing private conspiracies to deprive citizens of
equal protection).
6 See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5908-09 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80
COLUm. L. REv. 346, 350 (1980); Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. Cm. L. REv.
Z32, 343 (1980).
7The language and interpretation of the Act have raised a number of challenging issues for courts and scholars. Defining the prevailing party requirement
has been a source of litigation, see, e.g., Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979);
Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 303 (1st Cir. 1979), and commentary, see Note,
Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUm. L. REv. 346 (1980); Comment, Attorney's Fees
in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
47 U. Cm. L. REv. 332 (1980).
Recent decisions and commentary have dealt with immunity under the Act. See
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S.
719 (1980) (upholding immunity of Virginia judiciary because acting in legislative role in regulating state bar); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (no immunity for judicial officers acting in official capacity),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 898 (1981); Note, Hutto v. Finney: State's Eleventh
Amendment Immunity Substantially Reduced, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 541 (1979);
Note, Sovereign Immunity Bars Awards of Attorney's Fees Against the United
States in Action Under Title VI, 24 VuL. L. REv. 242 (1979).
Commentators have also examined the methods of fee calculation, see Comment,
Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 331 (1980), and the question when fees
can be awarded and for what proceedings, see Comment, Interim Awards of
Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21
Anuz. L. REv. 893 (1979).
One writer has examined the Act's applicability to substantive litigation. Wolf,
Pendent Jurisdiction, Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 193 (1979).

I CIVIL BIGHTS ATTORNEYS' FEES.
I. USE OF CivIL RIGHTS LAWS TO PRESENT
NONCONST1TUTIONAL CLAIMS

A. Pendent Claims
Since the decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,8 it
has been accepted that federal courts have the power to decide all
questions presented by a case. This doctrine, loosely known as
pendent jurisdiction, permits federal courts to decide cases on both
state grounds and nonjurisdictional federal grounds, provided that
those grounds are properly tied to a jurisdictional federal ground. 9
The Court defined the necessary link between these claims in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'0 holding'that federal courts have
constitutional power to decide pendent claims when "[t]he state and
federal claims . . . derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact ....[And a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding . . . ,, But the power recognized
by the Gibbs Court is discretionary, subject to the trial court's
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants." 12
Pendent jurisdiction most narrowly defined would include only
the federal court's ability to hear and decide state law claims related to federal claims. 13 Such claims could be asserted in tandem
822 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion
stated "when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended ...
forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give
the [lower] Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or
of law may be involved in it:" Id. 823.
9 See generally C. Wrucnr, LAw OF FEDERAL CouNTs § 19 (2d ed. 1970).
10383 U.S. 715 (1966).
1l Id. 725.
12 Id. 726. The Court listed a number of factors to be considered in deciding
whether to hear pendent claims, including avoidance of unnecessary decisions of
state law, pretrial dismissal of the federal claims, predominance of the state issue, and presentation of federal policy claims. See id. 726-27.
It can be contended that the Gibbs test, stemming from judicial concern for
expediting the resolution of disputes based on the same facts, is altogether inappropriate for fee cases. This argument is based upon the premise that the Fees
Act is aimed at encouraging enforcement of substantive civil rights, so the Gibbs
policies do not come into play. This argument, however, has failed to persuade
the Supreme Court. Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 653 n.1 (1974)
with Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 129, 127 (1980). But cf. Note, The Concept
of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE
L.J. 627, 648 (1977) (arguing Gibbs test may be unconstitutional).
13 See C. WmaT, supra note 9, at 65. ("'Pendent jurisdiction,' as the term
[is]
used in this section, refers only to the joinder of state and federal claims....").
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with federal constitutional questions, federal statutory questions
which confer jurisdiction on the district court, or both.14
But pendent jurisdiction is not normally confined to this narrow meaning. Rather, the term is also used to identify cases in
which a federal statutory claim that does not confer jurisdiction on
the federal court is attached to a statutory claim that confers jurisdiction,15 or to a constitutional claim'.16 This broad definition was
the foundation of the Supreme Court's recent analysis of the con17
stitutionality of a Fees Act-based award for pendent claims.
That case, Maher v. Gagne, held that a Social Security Act claim
"pendent" to due process and equal protection claims supported a
fee award. The Court, considering the sovereign immunity question that looms large when the narrow definition of pendent claims is
considered, 8 stated that "Congress was acting within its enforcement
power in allowing the award of fees in a case in which the plaintiff
prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil-rights claim pendent to a
substantial constitutional claim ...

." 19

Even before this sweeping

dicta, lower federal courts had resolved the "pendent claim" issue
involving state claims by awarding fees any time the plaintiff had
not lost on the merits of the federal claim. 20

The Maher dicta can-

14 See, e.g., Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (state
claim pendent to first amendment claim); Network Project v. Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978)
(same); Till v. Unifirst Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 161 n.24
(5th Cir. 1981) (state claim pendent to National Flood Insurance Act); City of
S. Pasadena v. Goldschmidt, 637 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1981) (state claim pendent
to NEPA and Federal-Aid Highway Act).
IS See Riker Laboratories, Inc. v. Gist-Brocades N.V., 636 F.2d 772, 780
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (antitrust, patent, and declaratory judgment claim).
16 See, e.g., Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 132 (1979) (Social Security
Act claim); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 532-36 (1974) (same); Davis v.
Reagen, 630 F.2d 1299, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (same).
17Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
18 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19 448 U.S. at 132.
20 See Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1980) (state law negligence
claim pendent to § 1983 and fourteenth amendment claims; fees denied because
plaintiff lost on merits of constitutional claim); Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118
(5th Cir. 1980) (fees awarded without discussion of merits after claim mooted);
Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 614 F.2d 585 (8th Cir.) (fees awarded
although plaintiff lost on constitutional claim), vacated, 449 U.S. 809 (1980);
Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Assn, 574 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1978) (court
disposed of claim on grounds relating to challenged regulations ambiguousness instead of fourteenth amendment claims; fees awarded); Seals v. Quarterly County
Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977) (state voting rights claim pendent to fourteenth amendment claims; fees awarded); Bass v. Spitz, 522 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (state malicious prosecution claim pendent to fourteenth amendment claim; fees denied because plaintiff lost on merits of constitutional claim);
Russo v. New York, 515 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (malicious prosecution
and fourteenth amendment claims; fees awarded although plaintiff lost on consti-
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not help but expand that trend. Yet, as this Comment demonstrates,
Maher did not resolve the question whether fees may be awarded
when plaintiffs prevail solely on state pendent claims, and the lower
courts' holdings that fees are appropriate in such cases present constitutional questions as well as difficulties of judicial administration.
B. Federal Statutory Claims
Since the passage of the Fees Act, federal courts have awarded
fees to plaintiffs prevailing on statutory claims pendent to substantial constitutional claims2 1 This trend will certainly be reinforced
by the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot,' wherein
the Court considered the scope of section 1983 and of the Fees Act.
The Court first held that section 1983 is not limited to providing causes of action for claims arising under the constitution or
"some subset of [civil rights] laws." 23 Instead, six justices agreed
that section 1983 provides a remedy for "violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law." 24 The Court then held that
section 1988 allows an award of fees "in any § 1983 action." 2 Thus,
the Court has plainly held that federal statutory claims enforced
through section 1983 permit a fee award.
Because lower courts view fee awards as almost mandatory when
plaintiffs prevail,2 6 the Thiboutot holding essentially means that
any plaintiff prevailing on any section 1983 claim is entitled to fees.
This Comment suggests that Congress probably intended fee awards
in cases vindicating statutory claims, and that the eleventh amendment does not bar awards in such cases.
tutional claim); Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(fourteenth amendment, state law negligence, and malpractice claims; fees denied
because plaintiff lost on constitutional claim); Williams v. Thomas, 511 F. Supp.
535 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (civil rights and state assault and battery claims; fees
awarded; plaintiff prevailed on both claims); Anderson v. Redman, 474 F. Supp.
511 (D. Del. 1979) (state claim and fourteenth amendment claim; fees awarded;
constitutional claim not reached).
2
1See, e.g., Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 916 (1978) (Social Security Act); White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (same); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(Uniform Relocation Assistance & Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, Dept. of
Transportation Act, Federal-Aid Highway Act); Southeast Legal Defense Group
v. Adams, 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Federal-Aid Highway Act).
22448 U.S. 1 (1980).
23 Id. 4. The Court held that § 1983's "plain language" included all "laws,"
because "Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase [rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws]." Id.
24 Id.
2Id.
9 (emphasis in original).
2
6 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1275 (Sth Cir. 1980) (fees should
be awarded almost "as a matter of course").

494

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
II.

[Vol 130:483

INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF THE FEES ACT

While there may be constitutional limitations to Congress's
power to award fees in cases involving pendent and statutory claims,
that question need only be considered if those who enacted the
Fees Act intended it to apply to such cases. To determine whether
Congress gave guidance-about its view of the Fees Act's scope, it is
necessary to consider the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and Congress's purpose in passing the statute. 27
A. PlainLanguage
The plain language of the Fees Act gives no indication that
Congress expected pendent claims to trigger fee awards. The
statute states only that fees may be awarded "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title ....
," 28 Because state claims cannot be said to "enforce" any
of these statutes, it seems logical to conclude that such claims cannot serve as the basis for fee awards. But, despite the appeal of the
argument that Congress meant to exclude what it did not include,
other fragments of the inquiry into congressional intent point to the
29
opposite conclusion.
Federal statutory claims also seem to present a straightforward
question. Congress included only five statutes in the Fees Act's
coverage,80 and the enumeration of those statutes should exclude
all others. But the Court's dramatic expansion of section 1983's
reach in Maine v. Thiboutot 3l likewise expanded the Fees Act's
applicability. After Thiboutot, the Act's plain language clearly includes all federal statutory claims "enforced through" section 1983.
In Thiboutot, the Court emphasized that "fees are available
in any § 1983 action.... [T]here can be no question that Congress
passed the Fees Act anticipating that it would apply to statutory
2

7These three sources are traditionally considered in studying legislation. See
Comment, Eliminating Sex Discriminationin Educational Institutions: Does Title IX
Reach Employment?, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1980).
28 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
29 As a general rule, plain language should be determinative in statutory interpretation. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978);
Camminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). But this adage is by no means
binding on courts seeking to interpret the statute. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980) ("[t]he legislative history is entirely consistent with the
plain language.").
3
o See.supra note 4.

21448 U.S. 1 (1980).

See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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§ 1983. claimis." 32 Given the Court's use of legislative history to
support the "plain language" argument, it is appropriate .to consider the legislative record surrounding passage of the Act for
guidance about the Act's intended scope.
B. Legislative History
1. Pendent ClaimsThe House explicitly approved fee awards for plaintiffs prevailing on state pendent claims. The House Report states:,
In some instances ... the claim with fees may in-olve a
constitutional question which the courts are reluctant to'
resolve if, the non-constittuional [sic] claim is dispositive.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). In such cases, if
the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the "substantiality" test, see Hagans v. Lavine, supra; United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S' 715 (1966), attorney's fees may
be allowed even though the Court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff
prevails -on the non-fee claim arising out' of a -"common
United Mine Workers v.
nucleus of operative fact."
Gibbs, supra at 725. 33
The explicitness of this statement has persuaded even the Supreme
Court to end the state pendent claim inquiry there.34 But the
Senate's view of the bill could support a contrary result.
82 448

U.S. at 9 10 (emphasis in original).

83 H.R. RB.'. No. 1558, 94th Cdng., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976).
S4 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 & n.15 (1980).
Examination of the Fees Act's legislative history is complicated by the unusual
manner in which the bill was enacted. Senator John Tunney introduced the Senate bill, S. 2278, on August 1, 1975. 121 CoNG. REc. 26,777 (1975). Representative Robert Drinan introduced the House version, H.R. 9552, on September 15 of
the same year. Id. 28,607.
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 2278 on June .29, 1976, 122
CoNG. Rc. 12,317 (1976), but debate on the bill did not begin until September
21, 1976, id. 31,470.
Meanwhile, the House bill was reintroduced as H.R. 15460 on September 8,
1976, id. 29,274, and reported by voice vote of the Judiciary Committee on September 15, id. 30,556. At this point the House bill was identical to the Senate version. Id. 35,122 (Statement of Rep. Drinan). The bill was placed on the House
suspension calendar for consideration on September 21, but was not reached on
that day. Id.
With both houses of Congress racing to adjourn by October 1 in order to'
allow a month for campaigning before the November election, the House's failure
to consider the bill on September 21 portended failure for the Fees Act. The
floor managers of the two bills therefore agreed to pass the Senate bill in both houses
in order to avoid a conference. Conferences between the two houses generally
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Debate in the Senate focused on the bill's applicability to
"civil rights" claims. The Senate Report expressly states that the
bill "is limited to cases arising under our civil rights laws .

. . ."

3

Senator Kennedy, a principal sponsor of the legislation,3 6 stressed
that "the availability of fees awards [should] be expanded to encompass all major Federal civil rights laws. Not just a select fewchosen through historical accident-but all the civil rights laws of
this country ....

He later added:

3

The purpose of this bill is to aid civil rights. Before the
Alyeska. case .

.

.

. the Federal courts throughout the

country were... awarding attorneys' fees under the statutes
included in this bill.... In Alyeska the Supreme Court
said that, no matter how beneficial that practice might be
in certain areas of the law, only Congress . . . had the

power'to decide which areas of the law deserved the additional inducement of attorneys' fees for enforcement.
Civil rights is one of those areas.$8
The difficulty with limiting the Fees Act's application to civil
rights is that Congress never expressed its view about what cases
came under that rubric. For example, several statements view the
Act as applying only to cases brought to vindicate constitutional
settle differences in versions of the bill, and often issue reports to clarify ambiguities
in the legislative history.
In the Senate, James Allen of Alabama opposed the bill and, even after cloture,
attempted to stall passage of the measure by introducing and demanding a vote
on scores of amendments. The Senate finally agreed to an amendment providing
for awards to prevailing taxpayers in suits brought by the Internal Revenue Service.
Id. 33,311-12. In return, Allen promised that "ti]f this amendment is adopted,
[I] .. . will call up no further amendments, will make no further statements with
respect to the bil." Id. 33,311.
The Senate passed S. 2278 on September 29, 1976. Id. 33,315. The House
made consideration of the Senate bill, identical to H.R. 15460 in every respect except the Allen amendment, id. 35,122 (Remarks of Rep. Drinan), possible by
special order of the Rules Committee on September 30. Id. 34,322. That order
forbade amendments to the bill, and the House passed the Senate bill after one hour
of debate, see id. 35,121-29, on October 1, 1976--the last day of the 94th Congress. Id. 35,130. Given the somewhat frantic rush to pass the Fees Act, the
legislative history may be less than clear about what issues the legislators considered, and how they intended those issues to be resolved.
8

5

SENATE REPoRT,

supra note 6, at 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.

Nxws, 5908, 5912.
I See 122 CoNG. BEC. 31,471 (1976) (Kennedy substitute for Tunney bill);
cf. id. 31,850 (amendment by Sen. Allen to entitle bill "Tunney-Kennedy Civil
Rights Attorneys Relief Act of 1976).
ST Id. 31,472.
38Id. 33,314 (emphasis added).
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rights.29 Yet the legislation's sponsors explicitly drew a distinction
between "civil" and "constitutional" rights, explaining that both
were to be a proper basis for fee awards. 40
The Senate debates and report do not directly refer to the
pendent claim problem. The Senate, however, referred to the
House Report for clarification on another substantive point.41 And
the House debates on the substitute Senate bill explicitly stated
that body's understanding that the House Report would be au42
thoritative in interpreting- the Act.
In short, the legislative history leans toward allowing fees in
cases resolved on pendent state grounds. But the answer is far
from clear.
2. Federal Statutory Claims
The debates leading to the Fees Act's passage indicate that the
bill's sponsors anticipated that fees would be awarded in a broad
range of cases involving federal statutory claims. Representative
Drinan, the bill's principal sponsor, made clear that his view of the
Act's scope was quite broad. In discussing the Senate substitute
eventually adopted by the House, Representative Drinan explained
each of the statutes covered by the Act. He stated: "Section 1983
authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal
statutory rights as well as constitutional rights. For example, Blue
against Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974)."43
The Senate Report also viewed section 1983 as "redressing
violations of the Federal Constitution or laws by officiils sworn to
uphold the laws." 4 Indeed, Senator Kennedy's lengthy list of fee
cases includes one statutory cause of action among a list of examples
focusing on claims traditionally viewed as "pure" civil rights
actions. 45
39 See, e.g., id. 35,128 (Statement of Rep. Seiberling) ("violations of the Constitution").
40
See id. 35,118 (Statement of Rep. Seiberling) ("civil and constituti 6nal
rights"); id. 35,126 (Statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("constitutional and statutory
rights"); id. 35,122 (Statement of Rep. Drinan)

("Federal statutory as well as

constitutional rights").
41 Id. 33,312 (Statement of Sen. Kennedy).
42Id. 35,122 (Statement of Rep. Drinan).
43 Id. Blue involved a claim that North Carolina's Medicaid plan was inconsistent with the Social Security Act.
44

SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD.NEws 5908, 5911 (emphasis added).
45 122 CoNc. REc. 33,314 (1976).
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I • The Senate Report also includes a footnote listing several cases
irn-which fees were awarded before Alyeska, and.that footnote in,
.cludes "a wide variety of race and non-race cases, such as cases inv6lving . . . enforcement of federal statutory rights under, e.g.,
welfare, urban renewal, and highway relocation laws." 46
: In short, the intention of the principal sponsors of the Act in
permitting fees under section 1983 appears to have comprehended
the decision in Thiboutot, and fee awards against the states based
on federal statutory claims seem to follow their expressed intent.

C. CongressionalPurpose
Because the plain language and the legislative history of the
Fees Act, at least with respect to state pendent claims, are inconclusive, it is appropriate to consider whether awarding fees in cases
resolved on state pendent or federal statutory grounds is consistent
with the Act's purpose. This, as Professor Cox has noted, involves
determining the "general aim or policy which pervades a statute." 47
The Fees Act seeks to encourage private enforcement of civil
rights by insuring that the cost of legal counsel will not deter plaintiffs with legitimate grievances from filing suit.48 It seeks to fill the
gap in attorneys' fees awards in civil rights cases left by the Court's
decision in A lyeska.49 Yet the stumbling block is again the meaning
to be attached to the words "civil rights."
If civil rights include only constitutional rights, 0 then pendent
and statutory claims cannot appropriately give rise to fee awards.
46

STAFF oF SuBcomm. ON CoNsvrruoAL RGHTs or TnE SENATE Comm.
oN TEm JUrncmny, 94T CONo., 2D SEss., SotmcE Boo, [Fon THE] Cxvi. BIGHTS
ATTOroEY's FzEs AwARDS ACT OF 1976, at 291 & n.3 (Comm. Print 1976) (listing

eases referred to in SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 n.3, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE Cor. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912 n.3).
47
Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HIAv. L.
REv. 370, 370 (1947).
48

SSee, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 4, 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.

CODE CoiG. & An. NEws 5908, 5911, 5913; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th CoNG., 2d
Sess. 1 (1976).
49
See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. 35,126 (1976) (Statement of Rep. Seiberling);
SENATE RE irtT, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWs 5908, 5912.

4oOne courageous scholar ventures a definition of "civil rights" by contrasting

"civil liberties":
The usual illustrations [of civil liberties] are the freedoms of religion,
speech, the press and assembly. The other individual prerogatives, those
protected against state action with supplementary enforcement powers
granted to the federal government, are known as "civil rights". The best
illustration of these is the right to vote.
...
. In summary, civil liberties protect the individual against his
government-local, state, and national. Civil rights protect individuals
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Social security, for example, is not a constitutional right., Indeed,.
the Social Security Act is not even a statute guaranteeing..equal.
rights. 51 Similarly, a prisoner's. demand for nonnegligent medical
care by police or county hospitals would not rise to the level of a
constitutional "civil right."
52
But if civil rights means individual rights protected by law,
then the examples just noted could be classified as civil rights. For
example, a discharged employee might join a state law claim of
wrongful discharge to a section 1981 claim. A court resolving the
case only on state grounds would be hard pressed to hold that the
plaintiff had failed to vindicate civil rights, so fees would seemappropriate.
It is worth noting in examining congressional purpose that the*
Act "could not be broader." 53 Given its broad purposes of insuring access to courts and restoring fee award law to its pre-Alyeska
status, the Act suggests a broad reading of civil rights. This suggests that fees should be awarded in both state pendent and federal
statutory cases.
D. Summary
The plain language and legislative history suggest that fee,
awards may be appropriate for federal statutory claims. The statute's purpose also seems to support this view. Thus, the Court's
resolution of Thiboutot seems correct; but its care in reserving the
question in Maher indicates that there may be an important distinction between "civil rights" and "non-civil-rights claims." The
waters are also murky on the state pendent claim issue. On balance, it is the statute's broad purpose more than the fragments of,
against individuals and government ofciaIs in discriminating practices
based upon color, creed or national origin.
R. STOREY, Outi UNA INABiL RiGS 33, 35 (1965). The distinction Storey
draws between civil rights and civil liberties is supported by other 'scholars. See
J. TEN BROEX, THE AN StLAVERY ORIGINs or THE FouRTEENTH AmEDmmr 159

(1951) ("The common denominator [in enacting the fourteenth amendment] settled in [people's] minds by thirty years of abolitionist proselytization as the basis
for a means of achieving Negro rights, was thus the concept of the equal protectionof the laws for [people's] civil, that is, natural rights."); cf. E. NEwmAx, Crvm
LmEzRT Aim Crim Ric=S 81 (6th ed. 1979) (calling the 13th, 14th, and 15th
amendments the "Civil Eights" amendments).
5

See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Eights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).

52

See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J.) ("privileges
of [being] citizen[s].").
53 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 694 (1978).
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legislative history that siggests that fee awards in state pendent claim
cases are appropriate. It is, therefore necessary to consider the
sovereign immunity objection to such awards.
III. THE.SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY LIMrrATION ON THE

SCOPE OF THE

FEEs AcTr

A. Background
The only constitutional argument against the Act is that fee
awards in cases decided on pendent state or federal statutory grounds
infringe the states' sovereign immunity, guaranteed by the eleventh
amendment.54 To protect the Act from such a challenge, Congress
explicitly stated that it enacted the Act pursuant to its power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment.5 5
The proposition that the enforcement power of the fourteenth
amendment can override the eleventh amendment's guarantee of
sovereign immunity was established in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.5 6 In
that case the Court held that by specifically providing in the statute
for attorneys' fees in title VII suits, Congress evidenced its intent
to dispense with eleventh amendment immunity.5 7 The Court rea-

soned that " 'the Constitution now expressly gives authority for
congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced
within the Fourteenth Amendment.' "58 Because of that express
authority, the Court found that the eleventh amendment "and the
principles of state sovereignty which it embraces, are necessarily
limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." i9
Fitzpatrick, then, held that the fourteenth amendment's limitations on state authority gives Congress plenary power in enforcing
the amendment. That plenary power, provided that it is explicitly
54
The eleventh amendment provides: "The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The amendment, also bars suits by citizens of a state against that state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
55
SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.

NEws 5908, 5913. See 122 CONG. Ic. 35,123 (1976) (Statement of Rep. Drinan).
56427 U.S. 445 (1976).
57 Id.457.

581d. 455 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880)).
591d. 456 (citation omitted).
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and appropriately employed, is sufficient to overcome rights reserved
to the state by other constitutional provisions. 60
The Fees Act itself faced an eleventh amendment challenge in
Hutto v. Finney.6 1 In that case, the attorney general of Arkansas
argued that the eleventh amendment barred a fee award to prisoners
who prevailed against the state on eighth amendment claims. The
attorney general's argument was based largely upon the proposition
that sovereign immunity could not be abrogated without express
language in the body of the statute.
The Court rejected the "clear statement" 62 argument for three
reasons. First, the majority considered the plain language of the
statute and held that "the Act itself could not be broader." 63 Second, the Court found that the legislative history supported abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity.6 4 Third, the Court concluded that Congress's rejection of amendments designed to insure
state government immunity from fee awards expressed its intent
"in deeds as well as words." 65 The Court's holding, in short, was
that "plain indications of legislative intent" to utilize the enforcement power and to override sovereign immunity were sufficient to
overcome the eleventh amendment. 66
The Court, however, also discussed fee awards in terms of liti67
gation costs, adopting Justice Stevens' separate views in Fitzpatrick.
It is unclear whether this cost argument was meant to be an alternative basis for the Hutto decision or merely a supporting rationale for
the argument that fee awards were not "retroactive liability" against
the states, the imposition of which was forbidden by the Court's
decision in Edelman v. Jordan.68 At any rate, the dissenters viewed
6 See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531,
1539 (1981) ("[We should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent
to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. [In o]ur previous cases ... Congress.. .expressly articulated its intent to legislate pursuant to
§5.").

61437 U.S. 678 (1978).
82 1d

707 (Powell, J.,dissenting).

68 Id. 694.
64 Id.

6 Id. 694 & n.22.
66 Id. 694.
67 Id. 695-98. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 460 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment); infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
68 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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this argument as an alternative ground of decision, 69 . and took issue
with the contention that fees could properly be considered costs.
. Justice Rehnquist added a separate dissent.70 He argued that
Fitzpatrick's rationale was not appropriate for Hutto because the
former case involved a conceded equal protection violation while
the latter involved an eighth -amendment claim' 1 '. The eighth
amendment, however, does not apply to the states by its terms, and
Justice Rehnquist noted that "it is not at all clear to me that...
Congress has the same enforcement power under §5 with respect
to a constitutional provision which has merely been judicially 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth Amendment -that it has with
respect to a provision which was placed in that amendment by the
drafters." 72
This distinction reappeared in the unanimous portion of the
Court's opinion in Maher v. Gagne.73 The state there argued that
because Hutto involved a constitutional violation, its rationale was
not relevant to the statutory claim asserted in Maher.7 4 Of course,
the Court had already held that the constitutional claim in Maher
remained in the case for long enough to support a fee award.7 5
But the Court answered the argument that Hutto was inapplicable
by stating:

[A]s MR.

JUSTIcE REHNQUIST

noted in his dissent, the un-

derlying claim in Hutto was predicated on the Eighth
Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on any substantive provision of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The prisoners'
claim in- Hutto was therefore arguably more analogous to
the statutory claim involved in this case than to the constitutional claims asserted here or to the equal protection
76
claim asserted in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.
Despite the apparent import of this dicta, the Court expressly reserved the question whether "a federal' court could award attorney's
69437 U.S. at 707-08 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
7O Id. 710-18.

71 Id. 717. Justice 'hite joined this portion of the opinion.
'12 Id.

717-18.

73448 U.S. 122 (1980).
74 Id. 133- n.16.

75 Id. 131.
76 Id.

133 n.16 (citations omitted).
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fees against a State based on a statutory, non-civil-rights claim." 77
It is to that question that this Comment now turns.
B. The Scope of the Enforcement Power
Requests for fees in statutory, non-civil-rights cases essentially
present the question whether Congress can use the enforcement
power of the fourteenth amendment to create a "remedy" for a
substantive "right" not conferred by the Constitution. It is therefore necessary to consider the Court's pronouncements about the
limits of congressional power under section 5.
Professor Cox described the enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment as "a vast untapped reservoir of federal legislative power to define and promote the constitutional rights of individuals in relation to state government." 78 That power, which had
"lain neglected for almost a century[,]" 79 was first employed in
modern times to override a New York literacy test that arguably
discriminated against Puerto Ricans.
Katzenbach v. Morgan8 0 was a challenge by New York election
officials to the constitutionality of the section of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act striking down literacy tests when applied to persons
educated in schools in which the "predominant classroom language
[is] other than English ...

." 81 In upholding the constitutionality

of that section, seven members of the Court joined Justice Brennan's
opinion that, for the first time, tried to define the substantive limits
of the enforcement power.
Morgan was understood by one Justice to have held that "division of power between state and national governments, like every
provision of the Constitution, was expressly qualified by the Civil
War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination." 8 In the context
of remedying discrimination against Puerto Ricans, this observation
required the Court to hold that the enforcement power's reach was
identical to that of the necessary and proper clause. Thus, the
Court's test for analyzing the proper use of the enforcement power,
"as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with rela77 Id. 130.
78 Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional'Adfudicatioq and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HI-xv. L. REv. 91, 99 (1966).

79 Id. 101.

U.S. 641 (1966).
8142 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
80384
82

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129 (1970) (Black, J.).
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tion to the reserved powers of the States," I' was that expounded
by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.8 4
The Court interpreted the McCulloch test to require two inquiries. First, were the objectives addressed by the challenged legislation within Congress's power? Second, was the means Congress
used consistent with the Constitution? The Court held in Morgan
that the Act secured for the Puerto Rican community nondiscriminatory treatment by government in voting and in provision and
administration of governmental services, satisfying the first inquiry.
The Court then held that it was not necessary to assess and weigh
the various conflicting considerations, or Congress's resolution of
those considerations. The second prong of the Morgan test was
satisfied by the mere decision that the Court could "perceive a basis
upon which Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." 85
After Morgan resurrected the enforcement power as a useful
tool for federal legislation, Congress began advancing section 5 as a
basis for a series of controversial legislative actions. In Oregon v.
Mitchell,8 6 the enforcement power was said to support Congress's
power to lower the voting age in state elections-a proposition rejected by a narrow majority of the Court. Yet an equally narrow
majority held that the power did permit Congress to lower the
voting age in federal elections.8 7 In Fullilove v. Klutznick,s8 the
Court concluded, albeit without a single opinion, that the enforcement power gave Congress the right to set aside a percentage of government contracts for minority business enterprises. In between
those two landmark decisions, the Court concluded in Fitzpatrickv.
Bitzer that the enforcement power was sufficient, when expressly
employed, to override even the states' sovereign immunity reserved
by the Constitution itself. Thus, the enforcement power represents
a potent weapon for federal intervention in state government, lims 3 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzen-

bach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
8417 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
85 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
86 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

SId. 117-18 (Black, J.).

Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall

would have held that Congress may set the voting age in all elections. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun believed that Congress could
not legislatively control voter qualifications at all.
88 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Chief Justice Burger wrote a plurality opinion for
himself and Justices White and Powell. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the result.
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ited only by the broad two-step inquiry developed in Morgan and
reiterated by the Fullilove plurality.8 9
C. The Enforcement Power and Rights Not
Guaranteed by the Constitution
Despite the enforcement power's broad scope and the vagueness of the limits on its use, one question remains particularly troubling. That is the inquiry whether Congress may use the power to
protect, or create, rights not explicitly granted by the Constitution.
It is noteworthy that the Court dealt with a related question
in Morgan. Justice Harlan, in dissent, suggested that the "fundamental issue [is] whether in fact the state [practice or] enactment
violates federal constitutional rights." 9o He therefore suggested
that section 5's scope extended only to state action determined by
the courts to violate the fourteenth amendment.
The Court firmly rejected that argument. 91 In fact, it explicitly refused to consider whether the literacy requirement violated the equal protection clause, limiting its inquiry to whether
92
the legislation was appropriate to enforce the clause.
This prompted Professor Cox to conclude that the Court had
explicitly held that Congress could, under the enforcement power,
prohibit state practices which did not themselves violate the fourteenth amendment.93 The Court seems to agree.9
In City of Rome v. United States,95 the Court reiterated its
holding in Morgan by stating that legislation enacted under the
89 Id. 473. The plurality inquired whether "the objectives of this legislation
are within the power of Congress." Id. (emphasis in original). It then assessed
whether the means employed were constitutionally permissible for achieving Congress's objectives.
90384 U.S. at 670 (dissenting opinion). Justice Stewart joined the opinion.
91 Id. 648-49.
92 Id. 649-50.
93 Cox, supra note 78, at 107-08.
94 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("in effect the Court
reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the
substantive scope of the Amendment") (emphasis in original); see also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("It is clear, then, that under
[the enforcement clause] of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment . . . .");
id. 207 n.1 ("[T]he nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as coextensive") (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149 n.5 (1976) ("We
have recognized that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power
to expand the substantive reach of the Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan.")
(Marshall, J.,dissenting); cf. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (test for employment of
enforcement powers same regardless whether fourteenth or fifteenth amendments
involved).
95446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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enforcement power "would be upheld so long as that Court could
find that the enactment 'is plainly adapted to [the] end' of enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause and 'is not prohibited by but is consistent with "the letter and spirit of the constitution." '

"

16

In a

highly significant addition to this restatement of the Morgan test,
the Court stated that this is so "regardless of whether the practices
outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection
Clause." 97 The Court supported this conclusion by pointing out
that "correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 98 This, in the understanding of both
"liberal" and "conservative" Justices, answers the question whether
Congress can use the enforcement power to expand the scope of
the fourteenth amendment's substantive protection.
The question with respect to the Fees Act's constitutionality,
therefore, is not whether Congress could include federal statutory
and state pendent claims within the scope of fourteenth amendment protection. The Court's view on that inquiry seems settled.
Instead, the question is whether fee awards in such cases are an
"appropriate" means of achieving the permissible objective of enforcing the fourteenth amendment against the states. 99
D. The Appropriateness of Fees in Non-Civil-Rights Cases
It can be argued that the Court's reasoning in Katzenbach v.
Morgan 100 effectively forecloses consideration of the appropriateness of a statute enacted pursuant to the enforcement power provided the law meets a "rationality" standard. 1' 1 This argument
is reinforced by the Court's dicta in Maher v. Gagne 102 to the effect
that Congress was acting appropriately in authorizing fees in a case
involving a statutory non-civil-rights claim pendent to a "substan96 Id. 176 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 421)).
97Id. 176.
98Id. (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651).
9 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980) (plurality opinion);
supra text following note 84.

110384 U.S. 641 (1966).

See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.

101 See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651-57; id. 656 ("[I]t is enough that we
perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate [its] judgment .... ); id.
653.
102448 U.S. 122 (1980).
1D3

Id. 132.
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tial" constitutional claim, 03 and by the Court's endorsement of
the Second Circuit's equally broad reasoning. 104
But this position sweeps overly broadly, including within the
ambit -of "appropriateness" not only statutory and pendent claims
attached to constitutional rights but statutory non-civil-rights claims
asserted through section 1983 or standing alone. Yet the Court
expressly left open in Maher the question whether such claims
could support fee awards. 0 5
Resolution of that question requires consideration of the various arguments about whether sovereign immunity bars a fee award
in these cases. If so, the Fees Act could not be "appropriate" legislation in such cases for enforcing the fourteenth amendment.
1. Arguments Against A Sovereign Immunity Bar
Only one court has considered the question left open by Maher
v. Gagne. In Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams,106 plaintiffs challenged the construction of a highway based on the due
process and equal protection clauses and on various state and federal statutory grounds asserted through section 1983. The district
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on a claim under the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, 0 7 dismissed the remaining claims as
moot, and awarded fees. The court reasoned that the constitutional
claims were "not insubstantial," 108 meeting the Hagans v.
Lavine '09 test, and that the constitutional and Highway Act claims
arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact," 110 meeting the
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs ' test. Thus, on the basis of footnote 7 of the House Report accompanying the Fees Act,"z2 the
court awarded fees.
104

Id.

127 n.9.

105 Id. 130.
100 657 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1981). For a similar holding, see Morgan v.
McDonough, 511 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., No. 80-1746 (1st Cir.
June 30, 1981).
10728 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1976). See Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams,
436 F. Supp. 891, 894-95 (D. Or. 1977), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1981).
108 436 F. Supp. at 894-95.
11"415 U.S. 528 (1974). Hagas defined insubstantial as "essentially fictitious," "wholly insubstantial,:' "obviously frivolous," and "obviously without
merit." Id. 537 (citations omitted).
110 436 F. Supp. at 894-95.
11 383 U.S. 751 (i966). See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
112H.R. REP. No. 1588, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976). See supra text

accompanying note 33.
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The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on Maine v. Thiboutot,113 the court held that section 1983 was a proper vehicle for
asserting the Highway Act claim. Again relying on Thiboutot, the
court then concluded that the Fees Act "authorize[s] an award of
attorneys fees in a § 1983 action based upon a statutory, nonconstitutional claim." 114
Having concluded that the Act permitted fees, the court was
required to consider whether the eleventh amendment barred the
fee award in spite of the legislature's attempted authorization. Repeating the Supreme Court's discussion of statutory claims in Maher,
the Ninth Circuit rested its affirmance on the Hagans and Gibbs
tests, and on footnote 7.115

Thus, the court did not resolve the question left open by
Maher in its holding. The question reserved in Maher was whether
fees could be awarded "based on a statutory non-civil-rights
claim." 116 The Ninth Circuit concluded in dicta that fees were
authorized in such a case, but it rested its decision on the Gibbs
test and the "substantiality" of the attached, but unresolved, con17
stitutional claim.
Nevertheless, Adams effectively answers the question reserved
in Maher by expanding fee awards to cases involving procedural
rather than substantive due process claims. It will be a rare case
when plaintiffs cannot construct a "substantial" procedural due
process claim within the Hagans Court's definition of that word.118
113448 U.S. 1 (1980).

See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.

114 657 F.2d at 1123 (emphasis added).
115 Id.

1124-25.

116 448 U.S. at 130.
117 657 F.2d at 1124-25 ("The district court... found plaintiffs' constitutional
claims to be substantial and found that the . . . claims arise out of a 'common

nucleus of operative fact.' We agree with the district court."). See Morgan v.
McDonough, 511 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., No. 80-1746 (1st Cir.

June 30, 1981) (same); cf. Milwe v. Cavuto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981)
(court concludes in dicta that Maher justifies fee award in favor of plaintiff prevailing on state pendent claim).
118 The Hagans test for substantiality eliminates only claims that are "obviously
frivolous." See supra note 109.
The constitutional claim in Adams was a due process argument based on "inadequate notice and failure to conduct [a] hearing so as to allow for meaningful
public comment." 657 F.2d at 1125. The court noted that such "[a] violation ...
Id.
is a distinct possibility whenever a right to a hearing is abrogated .... .
Thus, the court did not distinguish between substantive and procedural due
process claims. It is interesting to note that in other contexts involving § 1983
claims, the Supreme Court has made that distinction. See Parratt v. Taylor, 101
S. Ct. 1908, 1914 (1981); id. 1918 (White, J., concurring); id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); id. 1922 (Powell, J., concurring in the result); Carey v. Piphus, 435

U.S. 247, 265 (1978).
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According to Adams, such a claim guarantees fees if the plaintiffs
prevail on any related issue.
This bootstrap rationale for overcoming the sovereign immunity bar is at once expanded and explained by the argument that
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment signified a "repeal" of
the eleventh amendment. This view holds that because the eleventh
amendment cloaks the state with a constitutional immunity, only
constitutional action can overcome that immunity. Section 5 is
that constitutional action, giving Congress the power to legislatively
authorize otherwise impermissible actions against the states. Under
this view, the Fees Act, in which Congress made its intention to
abrogate immunity sufficiently explicit for the Supreme Court,
overrides eleventh amendment immunity in every case.11 9 This
position, then, makes Congress itself the arbiter of what is "appropriate" legislation under section 5. In that respect it reflects the
Court's view in Katzenbach v. Morgan 120 and subsequent section
I
5 cases. 121
In Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation,2 2 a panel of
the Fifth Circuit considered this position. The court's approach to
the argument was somewhat opaque, for it seemed to reject the
suggestion that section 5 flatly overturned the eleventh amendment. 2 3 Yet it held that the critical inquiry in these cases was Con-

gress's intent, for "Congress still need[s] intentionally to abrogate
the state's eleventh amendment immunity . .

.

. Thus . . . the

eleventh amendment could still bar suit in federal court where
Congress ha[s] acted under section 5.

The inquiry . . . [is] how

clearly Congress... intended to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity." 124

It seems that the court rejected the repeal argument in one
breath and accepted it in the next. For the recognition that Congress can override immunity if it intends to do so means that the
court concluded that there was no longer a constitutional bar to
suits against the state. This must be so because Congress cannot
110 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978).
120 "§

5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exer-

cise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure

the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 384 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.
122 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979).
23
1 See id. 1078 (Supreme Court's approach to § 5 goes "beyond mere statutory
interpretation").
124 Id. 1079 (emphasis in original). See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-46
(1979) (§1983 and abrogation of sovereign immunity).
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legislatively "abrogate" a provision of the constitution 125 unless

some other constitutional provision gives Congress authorization.
Thus, by authorizing legislation that has the effect of overriding the
eleventh amendment, section 5 must repeal that amendment to the
extent that the two are inconsistent.
Other arguments against an eleventh amendment barrier to
fees focus on section 5's purpose of requiring the states to conform
their behavior to the commands of section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment. 126 It can be argued that this purpose cannot be carried
out without fee awards in pendent and statutory claim cases because,
with plaintiffs limited to injunctive relief, there is no incentive to
sue states and require them to honor the fourteenth amendment's
127
commands.
Professor Nowak expressed a similar point by stating: "The
drafters of the fourteenth amendment would, thus, not have tolerated a position which denied Congress the power to create private
causes of action enforceable in federal courts against states which
refused to extend protection to the rights embodied in section 1 of
the amendment." 128 Of course, section 1983 does not create a
cause of action-it merely provides a remedy for enforcement of
constitutional and statutory provisions. 129

But it is easy to analogize

Nowak's position to the fee context. For if Congress can create
causes of action under section 5, then it can surely aid the enforcement of these causes of action by permitting a fee award.
This argument assumes that federal statutory and state pendent
claims actually force states to comply with the equal protection and
due process clauses. To support this position in every case-for the
legislative history of the Fees Act forecloses the argument that Congress meant fees and sovereign immunity to depend on the nature
of the right asserted determined on a case-by-case basis 130-it is
l 25 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
126 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n.8 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 2768 (1866) (Statement of Sen. Howard)).
7
12
See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203,
1238-39 (1978) ("[Clongressional authorizations of suit are meaningful only if
they make available some [damage] remedy.").
128 Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1413, 1463 (1975).
129 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
10See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 Ui.S. 1, 9-10 & n.7 (1980).
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necessary to invoke the prophylactic rationale of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach 131 and Katzenbach v. Morgan.132
That view suggests that Congress may prohibit as a precautionary measure any practice lending itself to fourteenth amendment
violations. On this theory, violations of federal statutes or state
law by state officials, while not reaching the level of constitutional
deprivations, nevertheless involve state-sponsored abuses of indi-vidual rights. 33 If unchecked, these abuses will lead to future
violations that will ultimately reach the level of fourteenth amendment violations.134
In other words, the difference between police negligence and
police brutality is only a matter of degree, and Congress, in its discretion under section 5 about what measures are appropriate to enforce the fourteenth amendment, is privileged to outlaw the lesser
offense in order to avoid the greater. 35 Accepting this theory, fee
awards against the state are vital in order to make it worthwhile for
plaintiffs to sue, preventing further, and future, abuses. This view
permits fees whenever plaintiffs prevail on a statutory or pendent
claim which presents a likelihood of future, possibly constitutional,
violations.
A related argument suggests that section 5's purpose is to enlarge federal court jurisdiction to protect "civil rights." 136 Whether
131 383 U.S. 301 (1966). This case upheld the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973
to 1973aa-5 (1976)), under the enforcement power of the fifteenth amendment.
U.S. Co sT. amend. XV, § 2.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
132 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
133
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 ("[The statute] enables the
minority better to obtain 'perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection
of the laws."'); id. 649 ("Without regard to whether the judiciary would find
that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies [the] literacy requirement ....
could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5
... ?") (emphasis added); cf. id. 648 ("A construction of § 5 that would require
a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law . . . violated the
Amendment . . . 'would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.") (footnote omitted).
The omitted footnote is instructive about Congress's view of section 5s purpose.
Id. n.8.
134 Compare Russo v. New York, 515 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (malicious
prosecution claim essentially establishes elements of fourteenth amendment claim)
with Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (negligence
and malpractice claims do not establish elements of fourteenth amendment claim).
315See supra note 120.
-As for the difference--or lack of it-between police brutality and negligence,
see Hays v. Jefferson County, Nos. 80-3010, -3011 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1982) (negligent
failure to train police does not make supervisors liable for § 1983 claim of police
brutality). But see Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (negligent deprivation states a cause of action under § 1983).
.
136 Nowak, supra note 128, at 1463.
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those rights are "privileges of [being] citizen[s]," 187 or whether they
are only laws insuring equality, 38 violations of civil rights requires
an incentive to make use of federal jurisdiction. Knowing that they
cannot recover damages from the state, plaintiffs are unlikely to
bear the expense of suing for injunctive relief without the assurance that, if successful, they will not have to bear counsel fees.
The weakness of this argument is that a permissive grant of
jurisdiction is not the same as a requirement that federal courts hear
the case. This is especially true when, as in state pendent claim
cases, the jurisdiction is judicially created. Furthermore, the Court's
decision in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization 39'
makes it clear that jurisdiction over claims under section 1983 does
depend on the nature of the right being enforced. Thus, "pure"
civil rights statutory claims are jurisdictional under section 1343(3);
statutory non-civil-rights claims are jurisdictional only under section 1331.140 The Court rejected this distinction for fees purposes
in Maine v. Thiboutot,141 but such a distinction could be resurrected for sovereign immunity cases.
In short, the "repeal" and prophylactic rationales for overcoming sovereign immunity present the most compelling arguments for
fees awards in statutory and pendent claim cases. Each of these
theories, explicitly or implicitly, has gained acceptance in federal
courts.
2. Arguments for A Sovereign Immunity Bar
The first argument that sovereign immunity bars a fee award
in pendent and statutory claim cases is that Congress, even though
acting pursuant to section 5, cannot "incorporate" nonconstitutional
rights into the fourteenth amendment. This contention seems fore42
closed by the views expressed by several members of the Court.
It is worth noting, however, that the Court has expressed the view
that congressional power under section 5 is limited to "adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the [fourteenth] amend137

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 163 (1970) (Harlan, J.).

38

1 See id. 150-52 (Appendix to Opinion of Douglas, J.) (list of cases striking
down statutes not discriminating on the basis of race under the equal protection

clause).

139 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
§ 1988 from § 1343).
140 441 U.S. at 615-20.

See Maher, 448 U.S. at 129 n.11 (distinguishing

141448 U.S. 1 (1980).
142

See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
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ment." 143 There may, therefore, be some uncertainty in the view
that Congress may expand the fourteenth amendment's substantive
xeach by using the enforcement power.
The second argument is that a fee award, no matter how
,described, violates two tenets of the eleventh amendment. First,
it permits the imposition of direct-not ancillary-burdens on the
:state treasury. 44 Second, it permits a retroactive monetary award
;against the state. 4 5 These potential problems are of no concern
if eleventh amendment immunity is in fact abrogated, so constitutional claims and claims under statutes providing for equal rights
-resent no eleventh amendment difficulty. But in pendent and
statutory non-civil-rights claim cases, where Congress's intention is
not so clearly expressed, courts should be hesitant to award relief
that would otherwise be barred. 46
The Court in Hutto v. Finney 147 addressed and rejected both
,of these arguments. It held that fees were not retroactive awards
for prelitigation conduct, but for "expenses incurred in litigation
seeking only prospective relief." 148 With respect to the burden on
the state treasury, the Court held that because fees are awarded as
149
part of costs, they are an ancillary burden to litigation.
The third argument for sovereign immunity is based upon the
jurisdictional statutes and the decision in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization.50 In Chapman, the Court held that
section 1983, through which all statutory fee claims are asserted, was
enacted to "ensur[e] a right of action to enforce the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment and federal laws enacted pursuant
thereto." 151 Because statutory claims that do not protect equal
14s Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
144 Nowak, supra note 128, at 1444. See Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403
.(C.D.

Cal. 1980) ($2.2 million fee award against state).

45

1 Nowak, supra note 128, at 1464.
146 See supra note 60.
147437

U.S. 678 (1978).

148 Id.

695 & n.24; id. 698 n.31 (discussing retroactive liability issue "[Ilf we

were not dealing with an item such as costs .... ).
14 9 See SEATr

R

or,

supra note 6, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.

CoDE CONG.

& AD. NEws 5908, 5913 ("ancillary"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 697 n.27
("[A]n award of costs . . .could hardly create an [enormous fiscal burden] for
a State."). But see Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ($2.2
million award).
150441 U.S. 600 (1979).
151

Id. 611 (emphasis added).
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rights, like the Social Security Act claim in Chapman, are not
enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, they are not within
the "pure" scope of section 1983. Thus, a fee award in such cases
distorts the purpose of section 1983 and of the Fees Act.
However plausible such an argument sounds, it runs squarely
into the Court's decision in Thiboutot. For if section 1983 encompasses all statutory claims, the "civil-rights"-"non-civil-rights" distinction in Chapman would make the fee award dependent on the
nature of the right asserted. This result would run counter to the
purposes of the Act and to the decision in Thiboutot.15 2
A similar argument stems from the Chapman Court's holding
that there is no such thing as a suit for "violation" of section 1983
because that statute provides only a remedy and not a substantive
right. 153 This led the Court to conclude that section 1343(3), the
jurisdictional counterpart of section 1983, did not confer federal
jurisdiction when section 1983 was used to remedy a violation which
did not involve a statute providing for equal rights.15 4
Thus, the argument claims that, in statutory and pendent claim
cases, fees are a remedy not for a substantive violation but for the
use of another remedial statute. This bootstrap abrogation of immunity allows an award against the state even though neither the
federal statutory or state pendent substantive ground, nor the statute providing federal jurisdiction, abrogate that immunity by
themselves.
A federal district court recently relied on this bootstrap argument to deny fees in a statutory case asserted through section 1983.255
It is significant, however, that the court did not rely on sovereign
immunity in refusing the award. Rather, it held that as a matter
of discretion, it would not award fees when section 1983 was used
merely as a "conduit" for a nonfee claim. 58
Finally, there is the argument that allowing sovereign immunity
to be abrogated by a pendent claim "repeals" the eleventh amendment in almost every case. Under this view, allowing jurisdiction
over claims tied to constitutional allegations-many of which will
15 2 See 448 U.S. at 9-10.
153 441

U.S. at 617-18.
154 Id. 618.
l5 Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981). The case involved
a claim under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 14111420 (1978 & Supp. 1981). The court refused to award fees because it held that
section 1983 could have no greater role in the outcome of a lawsuit than the statute
it enforces.
156 516 F. Supp. at 984.
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never be resolved by the federal court-essentially permits federal
judges to abrogate sovereign immunity at -their discretion. The
point becomes particularly clear if fee awards are permitted in state
pendent claim cases. Then federal courts set aside immunity merely
by accepting jurisdiction over a pendent claim. This is so even if
the underlying constitutional claim is not reached. Because of the
ease with which pendent claims can be attached to "nonfrivolous"
constitutional claims,5 7 district judges may be required to refuse to
hear pendent claims in order to avoid the immunity question.
If federal courts use discretion not to hear pendent claims in
potential fee cases, plaintiffs are required either to split their claims
between state and federal court or to bring the entire claim in state
court. The latter undermines the notion that plaintiffs have a right
to a federal forum for their federal claims; 158 the former exacts
additional costs from litigants and wastes judicial resources.' 5 Furthermore, even assuming that plaintiffs will take their claims to state
courts, they will presumably ask those courts for fees-as did the
plaintiffs in Thiboutot-or return to the federal court after state
litigation is completed to request a fee award.
E. Summary
The interaction between the enforcement power and the eleventh amendment is nowhere more puzzling than when Congress
acts to expand the substantive protections of the fourteenth amendment. The issue of fee awards in cases involving pendent and statutory non-civil-rights claims squarely presents the enforcement power
and sovereign immunity conflict.
57

See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 675 (Stewart,
J.,dissenting); Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1236 n.5 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Moreover, plaintiffs also initially asserted in their complaint an arguably substantial
constitutional claim under the fourteenth amendment, which, although never decided,
was arguably sufficient to . . . bring the . . . action within the ambit of Section
1983.") (emphasis added).
158 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exams., 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); Moore v. El Paso County, 660
F.2d 586, 591 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981) ("right to a federal forum"). But see Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103 (1980) (no right to unencumbered opportunity to
litigate federal claim in district court); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's
Servs., 648 F.2d 135, 144 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (no "right [to have a federal
court consider federal claims] exists.") (plurality opinion); Whitman, Constitu-

tional Torts, 79 MICH. L. Rav. 5, 25 (1980) (broad reading of § 1983 "displaces

state lawmaking authority by diverting decisionmaking to the federal courts").
159 For example, the policies underlying Gibbs are judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. See 383 U.S. at 725; supra notes 10-12 and
accompanying text. See also Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500
(1941) ("avoid the waste of a tentative decision ... ").
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The arguments that sovereign immunity does not bar fee
awards in these cases essentially focus on section 5's purpose and on
its implied repeal of the eleventh amendment. The arguments that
sovereign immunity bars a fee award are essentially reduced by
decisions of the Supreme Court to the "bootstrap" argument.
This Comment now considers two rationales that avoid the
immunity question in pendent and statutory claim cases. The Comment then concludes with an analysis of the relative merits of the
arguments for and against a sovereign immunity barrier to fees in
such cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A. Fees as Costs
Justice Stevens's separate opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 6 0
advanced the argument that fees should be awarded against states
without consideration of the eleventh amendment. He suggested
that fees should be treated as litigation costs, which are traditionally
awarded against states because costs are "incident to litigation"
and not "retroactive relief." 161

The position that fees should be treated as costs gained majority support in Hutto v. Finney 162 and Maher v. Gagne.163 The
Court's reasoning was based on prior precedent holding that costs
could be awarded against states 164 and on Congress's expressed
intention that fees under the Act were to be awarded "as part of the
costs." 165 This, in the Court's view, rendered sovereign immunity
inapplicable.
The fees as costs rationale has gained wide adherence in the
courts of appeals. 166 None of these courts has been persuaded by
the four Hutto dissenters' argument that counsel fees have not
"been part of the routine litigation expenses assessed against parties
160 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976)
161

(concurring in the judgment).

Id. 460.

162 437 U.S. 678 (1978).

163448 U.S. 122 (1980).
164 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 695-97; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70 (1927); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S: 583 (1924).
165 Hutto, 437 U.S. at 695 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).
166 See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, No. 79-3581 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981);
Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Alioto, 625
F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981);
Wisconsin Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 460 F. Supp. 1054
(E.D. Wis. 1978) (three-judge court); cf. Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d
49, 52 n.7 (6th Cir.) (describing costs as alternative holding and overruling inconsistent cases), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979).
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in American courts." 167 Despite the dissenters' additional argument that fees are "not intimately related to the mechanics of
litigation," 168 courts have granted substantial fees on the costs rationale and without regard to sovereign immunity.
One argument against the costs rationale is that if Congress
has the power to determine what litigation expenses are to be
treated as costs, then the eleventh amendment can be overcome
merely by designating any monetary award permitted by statute
to be assessed against the states as a "cost." The Hutto Court expressly protected itself against this eventuality, however, by stating
that the rationale did not necessarily apply to all cases in which
Congress designated monetary awards as "costs." 169
The second argument against the costs rationale is that it provides no principled reason for leaving open the question in Maher
whether fees can be awarded in statutory, non-civil-rights cases.
For if fees are merely costs in cases involving constitutional claims,
then they should likewise be costs in every case. The Court may
adopt this position in a future case; until it does, however, there
is no basis for suggesting that the costs rationale necessarily avoids
the sovereign immunity problem.
B. Reaching the Underlying Claim
In cases in which plaintiffs prevail on constitutional or statutory civil rights claims, Hutto and Maher establish that fee awards
are not barred by sovereign immunity. In cases in which plaintiffs
prevail on statutory non-civil-rights or state pendent claims, a court
could avoid sovereign immunity by deciding the underlying constitutional or civil rights claim.
The legislative history of the Fees Act indicates that Congress
intended courts to follow this course.170 But since the decision in
71
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,1
it has been a principle of
167 437 U.S.

at 707 (Powell, J., dissenting).

168 Id.
69

"Thus we do not suggest that our analysis would be the same if Congress
were to expand the concept of costs beyond the traditional category of litigation
expenses." Id. 697 n.24.
1

17 0

To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes
enumerated in H.R. 15460 with a claim that does not allow attorney fees,
that plaintiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees.

I.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976).
171213 U.S. 175 (1909).
See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
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judicial restraint that courts should avoid deciding constitutional
questions when other dispositive grounds are available. This, however, is a judicially-created rule and not a constitutional doctrine.1 2
Reaching the underlying claim avoids the sovereign immunity
question in all cases in which a constitutional or statutory civil
rights claim exists, for if that underlying claim is resolved, in the
plaintiff's favor, fees are appropriate under Hutto and Thiboutot.
If the plaintiff loses on the underlying claim, fees would not be
awarded because the plaintiff would not be a prevailing party under
the Fees Act.'78 Thus, in Southeast Legal Defense Group v.
Adams, 74 this approach would have required the court to reach
the procedural due process claim and would have avoided both
the sovereign immunity problem and the incongruousness of resting a fee award on the Federal-Aid Highway Act. 175
As a practical matter, this approach would resolve nearly every
fees case. This is so because most cases involve some constitutional
claim, and, for those which do not, it is not difficult to construct
such a claim. 176 Rather than permitting a court to award fees
177
merely by mouthing the "substantiality" test of Hagansv. Lavine,
resolving the underlying claim would require courts to examine
the merits of the civil rights claim in order to justify a fee award.
This approach is commendable because it vindicates the Act's
purpose of allowing litigants with federal claims access to federal
172 Justice Brandeis explained that the Siler rule is not constitutionally required, but was developed by the Court "for its own governance in cases confessedly within its jurisdiction .... ." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion).
173 See supra note 4.
174 657 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1981).

See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying

text.
175 It is important to note that there is no requirement that plaintiffs win damages in order to receive fees. Thus, courts reaching the underlying constitutional
claim solely for the purpose of deciding whether to award fees will not have to
calculate damages. This is so because all that the statute requires is that the
plaintiff be a "prevailing party," 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis- added),
and courts have interpreted this phrase to permit a fee award even when the
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages. Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d
Cir. 1981); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1, 2 .(1st Cir. 1979); see
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978). But see Huntley v. Community
School Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (no fees for "at most
a moral victory . . .
176 See supra note 157.

177415 U.S. 528 (1974). See supra note 109. A stricter standard of "substantiality" might avoid many fee cases involving pendent and statutory claims by
requiring plaintiffs to meet a greater burden in order to establish federal jurisdiction. The merits of adopting such a standard are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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courts, even when the state is a defendant. And plaintiffs who
prevail against the state on the kind of claim that the fourteenth
amendment explicitly protects-a constitutional or civil rights claim
-will receive a fee award. Yet by resolving the underlying claim,
courts prevent the' distortion of the Act's purpose that occur when
plaintiffs who meet the loose United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 717
and Hagans v. Lavine 179 tests are permitted to receive fees in spite
of the possible lack of merit of the underlying civil rights claim.
Furthermore, because reaching the underlying claim avoids a
constitutional question of sovereign immunity, the Siter doctrine
of avoiding the decision of unnecessary constitutional questions is
arguably not offended. Even if Siler suggests that courts should
not decide the underlying claim, Fees Act cases should be an exception to this judicially-created doctrine in order both to carry out
the legislative intent and to avoid abuse of the easily satisfied Gibbs
and Hagans tests.
C. Sovereign Immunity
If courts refuse to treat fees as costs or to reach the underlying
claim, then they must decide the sovereign immunity question.
The discussion of arguments for a sovereign immunity bar in part
III reveals that most of those arguments have found no support in
the courts. 8 0 The exception is the bootstrap problem; but if federal courts believe that plaintiffs are asserting claims through section 1983 solely to seek fees, those courts can use their statutory
discretion to refuse fee awards. 81 This use of discretion prevents
litigants from abusing the Act's purpose-as does reaching the
underlying claim-and at the same time avoids reliance on a sovereign immunity barrier.
On balance, the arguments that sovereign immunity does not
bar fee awards in these cases seem stronger than those favoring a
bar. The "implied repeal" argument has been adverted to at least
once by the Supreme Court. 8 2 The broad purposes of section 5
have been the subject of most of the Court's decisions interpreting
178

383 U.S. 715 (1966).

179 415 U.S. 528 (1974).

See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157 & 109.

180 See supra text accompanying notes 142-59.
181 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
1 82

See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 698 & n.31.
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that section.lss Finally, Congress's broad powers under section 5
and the limited judicial review of exercises of that power are well
established. l'
Combined with the broad judicial interpretation
of the Fees Act itself,185 the imposition of an immunity barrier to
awards in cases involving statutory non-civil-rights and state pendent
claims would be inappropriate.
183
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); supra notes 90-99
and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 78-89 & 101; supra note 120 and accompanying text.
285 See supra text accompanying note 63.

